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Despite the current debate about the concept of secularization and the poli-
tics of secularism around the world, Hannah Arendt has not generally been 
understood as a proponent of either. But her most prominent study of the 
liberatory possibilities that modern politics might allow, On Revolution, is 
also an account of the struggle against a civilization grounded on religious 
premises in favor of one beyond their claims. It would not be too much to say 
that Arendt placed secularization at the very center of her analysis of the 
revolutionary phenomenon and secularism at the core of her political hopes. 
Put simply, Arendt thought that what was at stake in modernity was leaving 
religion behind, at least as the foundation of public coexistence. Conversely, 
modernity took its most politically defective forms when (among other things) 
it had failed to make its necessary break with the religious civilization that 
preceded it.1
In what follows, besides reconstructing the fundamentals of Arendt’s 
case, I try to show that it is usefully interpreted as a kind of response to and 
critique of Carl Schmitt’s doctrine of “political theology” as outlined in a 
famous 1922 book of that name. Both Arendt and Schmitt were central to the 
revival of interest in the political as such in recent decades, both insisted on 
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1. For Arendt’s youthful fl irtation with theology and later turn to the secular in moral philosophy 
(as opposed to political theory, the subject of this essay) see my Origins of the Other: Emmanuel 
Levinas between Revelation and Ethics (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2005), esp. chap. 2.
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its autonomy from and irreducibility to other domains of existence, and both 
were deeply concerned with the founding of polities and constitutional order-
ing.2 But their common interest in modernization as some sort of seculariza-
tion (legitimate or not) deserves to be stressed, too. Now it is true that, despite 
overwhelming circumstantial evidence, there is no direct proof that Arendt 
herself saw On Revolution as a response to Schmitt’s thesis about the continu-
ation of religion in political guise. (There is direct evidence that Arendt saw it 
as an intervention in a twentieth-century debate, largely Germanic, that Schmitt 
sparked.) But even if the case for “hidden dialogue” is rejected, there is still the 
heuristic use of comparing the views of these two major fi gures.
Arendt willingly assented to the descriptive claim, most familiar from 
Schmitt’s brief but powerful presentation, that modern politics have often 
covertly depended on the continuation of religious premises or a religious 
foundation. If On Revolution was a response to Schmitt, it incorporated the 
position she wanted it to overcome. Alongside the familiar Grecophile and 
modernist Arendts, there is also a “medievalist” Arendt who attributed polit-
ical or quasi-political functions to the Christian church, ones that alone explain 
the persistence of some of the very religious fi gures of thought in the modern 
political imaginary that Schmitt had stressed in his time. This persistence 
could occur, the medievalist Arendt argued, because it was both diffi cult and 
dangerous for revolutionary modernists to substitute for those political func-
tions that the medieval church had executed so well. The essentially substitu-
tional quandary of revolution is one that, Arendt thought, could make progress 
and regress interpenetrate, as old religious fi gures of thought were not sim-
ply held over inadvertently but actively called back into service in the moment 
of revolutionary advance.
The comparison with Schmitt also throws into relief how far Arendt 
hoped to break with any normative conclusion that a full secularization of 
political life is an impossible goal. She could do so because of a shift in the 
model of secularization: if she thought she needed to account for what Schmitt 
implied only the hypothesis of the persistence of religion could explain, she 
conceded only that the very diffi culty of transcending religion made its 
2. For prior attempts to relate the two see Martin Jay, “The Political Existentialism of Hannah 
Arendt,” in Permanent Exiles: Essays on the Intellectual Migration from Europe to America (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1986), 237–56; William Scheuerman, “Revolutions and Consti-
tutions: Hannah Arendt’s Challenge to Carl Schmitt,” in Law as Politics: Carl Schmitt’s Critique of 
Liberalism, ed. David Dyzenhaus (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1998), 252–80; and Andreas 
Kalyvas, Democracy and the Politics of the Extraordinary: Max Weber, Carl Schmitt, Hannah 
Arendt (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008).
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appeal nearly irresistible precisely at the moment of possible farewell. Willing 
even to grant that modernity’s religious background persists in its absence, 
Arendt clearly thought that the novel diffi culty of substituting for the prior reli-
gious basis of political authority makes the modern situation fundamentally 
different from the classical past she so admired—and makes the latter’s exact 
resumption impossible. Even so, not only are modern secular politics possi-
ble for Arendt, but the revolutionary Americans—whom Schmitt had praised 
in Political Theology for recognizing the template in God’s sovereignty for 
their own popular rule—demonstrate how to achieve it. Nevertheless, there 
is respect for Schmitt even at the heart of Arendt’s normative divergence from 
him. The crux of her study of political revolution is that, even if it is not a 
requirement, political theology is a risk. Revolution in Arendt’s account is 
often a struggle against religion in which the latter wins. Yet she did not think 
it always had to do so.
Recovering Arendt’s secularization thesis and secularist politics is valu-
able not simply because they are bound up with an at least relatively system-
atic philosophy of history—one that helps motivate some of her more famous 
theoretical commitments (especially her antipathy to rights and her opposi-
tion to sovereignty). It is also valuable because of the withering contemporary 
skepticism about a commitment to “the secular” either as a historical category 
or as a political cause.3 Traditionally the rallying cry of the reactionary canon 
in political theory (its source for Schmitt, this canon’s most distinguished 
twentieth-century representative), the critique of secularization and secu-
larism has migrated to the left in the contemporary world. Alas, Arendt’s old 
and so far unrecognized partisanship for commitments once so common as 
to be unnecessary to defend against their marginal critics does not dispose 
of the prominent new opposition. If anything, a recovery of her claims in a 
changed theoretical context suggests their glaring faults. The emphasis in 
what follows is primarily on reconstructing Arendt’s case in the state—often 
unsatisfactory—in which she left it. But to do so without considering how she 
might respond to the forceful opposition to secularization and secularism 
today would miss the connection on which Arendt always insisted between 
historical study and present commitment.
3. Talal Asad, Formations of the Secular: Christianity, Islam, Modernity (Stanford, CA: Stan-
ford University Press, 2003); Gil Anidjar, “Secularism,” Critical Inquiry 33 (2006): 52–77. It is 
notorious how far once-secularist theorists have gone in fi nding a place for the alternative truth 
claims of religion in modern democracy. See, alongside the “turn to religion” in recent and contem-
porary Continental philosophy, Jürgen Habermas, “Religion in the Public Sphere,” European Jour-
nal of Philosophy 14 (2006): 1–25.
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The Problem of an Absolute
The baseline for appreciating the challenge of fi nding a secular basis for mod-
ern politics, as Arendt sees it, is a sense of the political or quasi-political func-
tions that Christianity has played in European civilization. Arendt is renowned 
for arguing in The Human Condition that “the victory of the Christian faith 
in the ancient world . . . could not but be disastrous for the esteem and the 
dignity of politics.”4 But she qualifi es or upends this thesis in On Revolution 
with a depiction of religion as playing a collective function that modern pol-
itics will have to inherit. Her treatment of the history of Christianity in the 
book, as well as in her related essay on authority, is frustratingly sketchy. But 
several dimensions of it are clear.
Arendt gives religion (at least Catholic Christianity of the medieval 
period) an institutional and functional interpretation. Far from simply extin-
guishing Roman politics, she argues, “Rome’s political and spiritual heritage 
passed to the Christian Church.”5 As she states elsewhere, the church was a 
“body politic,” indeed an “authentically authoritarian institution,” to be typo-
logically distinguished from both tyranny and totalitarianism.6 Of course, 
Christianity is based on otherworldly claims, but as a church its decisive effect 
is to establish the authoritative ordering at the heart of Arendt’s vision of poli-
tics, discharging burdens that modern and revolutionary politics will have to 
assume in their time. There is identifi able intellectual content to such other-
worldly claims—Arendt insists surprisingly often on the threat of eternal dam-
nation as Christianity’s chief political doctrine—but their function is to pro-
vide an institutionally grounded warrant for political coexistence.7 So the key 
4. Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1958), 314; 
cf. Arendt, On Revolution (hereafter cited as OR), rev. ed. (New York: Viking, 1965), 284.
5. Hannah Arendt, “What Is Authority?” in Between Past and Future: Six Exercises in Political 
Thought (New York: Viking, 1961), 125. This could happen, she states, because Roman politics (from 
which the concept of authority derived) were based throughout their history on “the sacredness of 
foundation,” which made the transition to Christian politics possible (“What Is Authority?” 104).
6. Hannah Arendt, “Authority in the Twentieth Century,” Review of Politics 18 (1956): 405.
7. She constantly attaches specifi c importance to hell and eternal damnation as “the only polit-
ical element in traditional religion” (Arendt, “What Is Authority?” 132). See also Hannah Arendt, 
“Religion and Politics” (hereafter cited as RP), in Essays in Understanding, 1930–1954, ed. Jerome 
Kohn (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1994), 380–84; and OR, 191, where Arendt emphasizes that even 
American state constitutions all include promises of future punishments. Similarly, late in life at a 
conference on her work, Arendt responded to remarks by Hans Jonas by saying, “I am perfectly 
sure that the whole totalitarian catastrophe would not have happened if people had still believed 
in God—or hell rather—that is, if there were still any ultimates” (colloquy in Melvyn A. Hill, ed., 
Hannah Arendt, the Recovery of the Public World [New York: St. Martin’s, 1978], 313–14).
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to interpreting this dimension of Arendt’s thought is balancing her critique 
of Christian antipolitics with her core view that such antipolitics could and 
did have political or quasi-political effects.
Arendt’s doctrine of “authority” in On Revolution is essentially a state-
ment of an enduring requirement for political ordering, identifying the ulti-
mate basis of collective cohesion (at least after the Greeks, who avoided its 
claims). But she uses other terms, too. Her description of religion’s function 
is that it provides a “sanction” for human coexistence that modernity will not 
be able to do without. Like authority, the term sanction is repeatedly used 
by Arendt in this connection, probably in both its positive sense of providing 
a warrant for community and its negative sense of a threat of adverse conse-
quences for members who might stray. But the most unusual phrase Arendt 
uses in On Revolution to describe this core doctrine of the book is the resonant 
but somewhat enigmatic “absolute.” Secularization is precisely the attempt not 
to escape from the authority and the sanction with which the absolute provides 
politics but to fi nd nonreligious versions of them.8 And this attempt comes to 
a head in revolution and in fact may defi ne that phenomenon’s deepest agenda 
as a search not just for liberty but also for secularity.
For a thinker usually thought uninterested in or opposed to religion in 
general and Christianity in particular, Arendt thus attributes an extraordinary 
effi cacy to them in providing an absolute in a way that irreligious politics can-
not easily rival. “The enormous signifi cance for the political realm of the lost 
sanction of religion,” Arendt writes,
is commonly neglected in the discussion of modern secularization, because 
the rise of the secular realm . . . seems so obviously to have taken place at 
the expense of religion. . . . Yet, as a matter of fact, this separation cut both 
ways, and just as one speaks of an emancipation of the secular from the 
religious, one may, and perhaps with even more right, speak of an emanci-
pation of religion from the demands and burdens of the secular. . . . Politics 
8. These commitments are marginal in most commentary on Arendt, probably because theo-
rists who place weight on authority as a necessary feature of social coherence have typically argued 
from a conservative (frequently Catholic) or reactionary position. See, e.g., Yves R. Simon, Nature 
and Functions of Authority (Milwaukee, WI: Marquette University Press, 1940); and Jesús Fueyo, 
“Die Idee der ‘Auctoritas’: Genesis und Entwicklung,” in Epirrhosis: Festgabe für Carl Schmitt, 
ed. Hans Barion et al., 2 vols. (Berlin: Duncker und Humblot, 1968), 1:213–26. Arendt’s main essay 
on authority fi rst appeared in Carl J. Friedrich, ed., Authority (Nomos I) (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 1958), in which the editor notes that the concept remains interesting despite its 
typical associations.
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and the state needed the sanction of religion even more urgently than reli-
gion and the churches had ever needed the support of the princes. (OR, 
159–60)9
With even more right and even more urgently: one may want to interpret 
Arendt as a follower of Friedrich Nietzsche and Martin Heidegger in her 
demand for a self-contained and postmetaphysical politics that fi nally and 
truly deserves the name, but one cannot fail to register her insistence that even 
such politics must have continuing recourse to an absolute of the kind that 
metaphysics in the form of religion provided far more plausibly and effi ca-
ciously than revolution could easily succeed in doing.10 According to Arendt, 
moderns tried to break with the religion of the past, but they could not leave 
behind the hardship of the demands and burdens it had so long borne. Of 
course, as the passage implies, those demands and burdens were always “secu-
lar” inasmuch as their effects were in this world—but medieval civilization 
with its otherworldly notions and devices discharged them with no trouble. It 
is as if Arendt thought that it was easier for religion to fulfi ll its necessary 
secular functions than a fully secularist regime could by itself.
Bound to Appear in Revolution
This approach places Arendt in (and may have originated as) a conversation 
with Schmitt, who following the reactionary tradition insisted on a neces-
sarily religious grounding to society. Arendt’s “response” to Schmitt would 
then take the form of a critique of the premises that allows concession on the 
details. For Arendt, it is not religion but the more basic requirement that reli-
gion meets that necessarily will continue into modernity. The question is 
whether the persistence of this requirement (which she concedes at the out-
set) must also entail the persistence of religion. “The long alliance between 
religion and authority,” she puts it at her clearest, “does not necessarily prove 
that the concept of authority is itself of a religious nature” (RP, 372). If the 
similarity in models allows her to concede Schmitt’s fi ndings of continuity, 
 9. Cf. Arendt, “What Is Authority?” 135: “Under these circumstances [of secularity—her word], 
religion was bound to lose its political element, just as public life was bound to lose the religious 
sanction of transcendent authority.”
10. The important postmodernist interpretations of Arendt omit or are uneasy with Arendt’s insis-
tence that, for all the waning of old forms of authority, the American Revolution illustrated the per-
sisting need of absolutes. See esp. Bonnie Honig, “Declarations of Independence: Arendt and Derrida 
on Founding a Republic,” American Political Science Review 85 (1991): 97–113; and Dana R. Villa, 
Arendt and Heidegger: The Fate of the Political (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996), 
esp. 157–65.
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the difference between them also exposes the hypothetical possibility of a 
secular politics. And if Arendt is in dialogue and contest with Schmitt, it is 
no surprise that the clash between their positions will have to emerge on the 
ground where the latter fi nds the religious template for modern politics still 
visible—political revolution, especially the American one.
Revolution is interesting to Arendt largely because the substitutional 
dilemma comes to a head in it. Where Schmitt alluded to revolution as the 
founding by a sovereign people on the model of God’s miraculous interven-
tion in history, for Arendt it is the moment when secularization is at stake. 
She begins with a treatment of European revolutions as successors of abso-
lutism. (Surprisingly and disappointingly, the Protestant Reformation is sim-
ply absent from her secularization theory.) Absolutism, Arendt says, might 
seem like “the fi rst and most conspicuous consequence of what we call secu-
larization,” playing an essential task in freeing politics from religion. Instead 
of presenting absolutism as depending on a political theology of divine right, 
Arendt thinks that absolutism represented a historical attempt to wrest author-
ity from the church in the service of secular politics. “Absolute monarchy,” she 
writes, “has been responsible . . . for the rise of the secular realm with a dig-
nity and a splendor of its own” (OR, 156).
Yet on closer inspection, Arendt continues, absolutism accomplished 
nothing of the sort. Its work, prior to revolution, is in retrospect simply dilatory 
and wholly negative, illustrating theoretically that some substitution for reli-
gion was necessary and postponing for revolutions the exclusive role of fi nding 
one. “Secularization, the emancipation of the secular realm from the tutelage 
of the Church, inevitably posed the problem of how to found and constitute a 
new authority,” she writes. “Theoretically speaking, it is as though absolutism 
were attempting to solve this problem of authority without having recourse 
to the revolutionary means.” In On Revolution Arendt probably uses the con-
cept of the absolute as shorthand for a diffi culty that all modern polities face 
because for her it is absolutism that pioneered the experiment of discovering 
a secular proxy for religion (OR, 157–58).11
But it failed, and its failure haunts all revolutions. One might have 
guessed otherwise, Arendt acknowledges. After all, the European revolutions 
characteristically took over after absolutist rule and might have led one to 
11. There is a second association in an early lecture on the subject, in which Arendt suggests 
that Plato and monotheism shared the attempt to establish a “transcendent source of authority” that 
“tried to impose something absolute on a realm where everything is relative” (“Breakdown of 
Authority,” New York University, November 1953, Hannah Arendt Collection, Library of Congress 
Manuscript Division, Essays and Lectures).
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think that it is only revolutions following upon such regimes (rather than all 
revolutions by defi nition) that might need and therefore seek some authorita-
tive grounding. One might argue that revolution need not have involved the 
simple replacement of one secular authority (king) with another (people) but 
done away with the need for authority altogether. But Arendt insists that the 
American Revolution, though it occurred in the isolated Eden of a new con-
tinent, showed that all revolutions are forced to search for some authoritative 
ground, of the kind that absolutism tried and failed to provide. The Ameri-
cans, in Arendt’s words, were for all their other exceptionalisms “not spared 
the most troublesome of all problems in revolutionary government, the prob-
lem of an absolute.” Indeed, “that the problem of an absolute is bound to appear 
in a revolution, that it is inherent in the revolutionary event itself, we might 
never have known without the American Revolution” (OR, 156). This is because 
absolutism itself was simply a fi rst, specifi c attempt to solve a general prob-
lem of displacing religion.
It is an interesting implication of Arendt’s secularization theory that not 
only do revolutions of necessity face the problem of the absolute, but only 
revolutions truly face it. Not simply absolutism but other possible solutions 
(she mentions the romance of the common law in ancient constitutionalist 
ideology) must also fail, and for the same reasons (OR, 161). “If it is true that 
the revolutions did not ‘invent’ the perplexities of a secular political realm,” 
she concludes summarily, “it is a fact that with their arrival, . . . former ‘solu-
tions’ . . . stood now revealed as facile expedients and subterfuges.” The 
implication is that revolutions are the only possible successors of religion. 
Absolutism emerges as an unstable and unworkable halfway house between 
religion and modernity, an attempt (failed but spectacular) to accomplish what 
revolution will try to accomplish without the trouble of revolution itself. Of 
course, Arendt sometimes uses the word secularization to refer to a lengthy 
historical process that might involve a multitude of events and factors. But 
other times she recognizes that the terms of her account mean that seculariza-
tion and revolution are not separate (let alone sequential) processes. Rather, 
they fully coincide and completely defi ne one another. Put differently, Arendt 
does not think that secularization simply prepares for revolution or that revo-
lution outlives the era of secularization as a permanent postreligious political 
possibility. Instead, secularization is possible only as revolution; conversely, 
the signature modern event of politics is available only insofar as it substitutes 
for religion. This surprising implication of Arendt’s conceptualization of the 
secularizing move is explicitly drawn early in the work: “What we call revo-
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lution is precisely that transitory phase which brings about the birth of a new, 
secular realm” (OR, 18–19; emphasis added). Revolution equals seculariza-
tion, and vice versa.
The Paradoxical Fact
Since religion disposed of a quandary with no immediately obvious solution 
except religion, then the problem of the absolute constantly made what Schmitt 
called political theology a temptation. This was the reason, Arendt notes in 
drawing the essential inference, that revolutionaries aiming at a secular poli-
tics so often turned back to the past in their very advance—why, in Schmitt’s 
terms, they crafted political theologies pervaded by naked or ersatz religion. 
Arendt’s work in identifying a revolutionary dynamic of religious entan-
glement is, in other words, the heart of her putative response to Schmitt’s 
theory.
Put differently, the hardship of substitution led revolutionaries, at the last 
minute, to foreswear the secularity they sought. It was, Arendt insists, “the 
enormous diffi culties which especially the loss of religious sanction held in 
store for the establishment of a new authority [and] the perplexities which 
caused so many of the men of the revolutions to fall back upon or at least to 
invoke beliefs which they had discarded prior to the revolutions” (OR, 114). 
Similarly, in perhaps the crucial passage, she argues that
in theory and in practice, we can hardly avoid the paradoxical fact that it 
was precisely the revolutions, their crisis and their emergency, which drove 
the very “enlightened” men of the eighteenth century to plead for some 
religious sanction at the very moment when they were about to emanci-
pate the secular realm fully from the infl uence of the churches and to sepa-
rate politics and religion once and for all. (OR, 186)
In Arendt’s thought, therefore, revolutions may be synonymous with secular-
ization, but they also are the moments when it is likeliest to be derailed.
This revolutionary dynamic powerfully affected both the American and 
the French Revolutions at the heart of Arendt’s comparative study, albeit in 
starkly different ways. But it is worth noting, before turning to that compari-
son, that Arendt’s emphasis on the profound challenge that displacing religion 
threw up for moderns can lead even her, beyond her emphasis on revolutionary 
diffi culties, to sympathize with doubts that modern secularization was worth 
trying. In this regard, Arendt, whose actual references to Schmitt nearly always 
single out his Nazi politics for discussion, may have had her own additional 
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reason to follow him in seeing the persistence of religion as a live option pre-
cisely at the moment of apparent modernization.12
In a dramatic passage Arendt reports that “enormous risks inherent in 
the secular realm of human affairs” made recourse to religion not simply 
tempting at a moment of diffi culty but also morally intelligible in view of 
what could well follow (OR, 192). It is as if, in Arendt’s rendition, the Ameri-
can founders were only partly driven by the sheer hardship of their tasks to 
revive religion, because they also intelligently chose it to stave off the worst 
potential consequences of their enterprise. “We, who had ample opportunity to 
watch political crime on an unprecedented scale, committed by people who 
had liberated themselves from all beliefs in ‘future states’ and had lost the age-
old fear of an ‘avenging God,’ are in no position, it seems, to quarrel with the 
political wisdom of the founders,” Arendt comments (OR, 192).
It was political wisdom and not religious conviction that made John Adams 
write the following strangely prophetic words: Is there a possibility that the 
government of nations will fall into the hands of men who teach the most 
disconsolate of all creeds, that men are but fi re fl ies, and this all is without 
a father? Is this the way to make man as man an object of respect? Or is it 
to make murder itself as indifferent as shooting plover, and the extermina-
tion of the Rohilla nation as innocent as the swallowing of mites on a mor-
sel of cheese? (OR, 192)13
12. She mentions him fi rst in a review of Max Weinreich’s indictment of “Hitler’s professors” 
and returns to him in a footnote of The Origins of Totalitarianism in a similar context. In the fi rst 
she counts Schmitt among those “outstanding scholars” who volunteered to serve the regime, and 
in the second she credits him with “very ingenious theories about the end of democracy and legal 
government [that] still make arresting reading” (even as Arendt emphasizes that though he volun-
teered to serve the Nazis, their interest in him proved short-lived). Max Weinreich, Hitler’s Profes-
sors: The Part of Scholarship in Germany’s Crimes against the Jewish People (New York: YIVO 
Institute, 1946); Hannah Arendt, review in Commentary 2 (1946), rpt. as “The Image of Hell,” in 
Essays in Understanding, 201; Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism, new ed. (New York: Merid-
ian, 1958), 339n65. See also Arendt, “Waldemar Gurian,” in Men in Dark Times (New York: Har-
court, Brace, 1968), 252.
13. Arendt is citing John Adams, Works, 10 vols. (Boston: Little, Brown, 1850–56), 6:281. But 
Arendt makes clear, in an exchange with Eric Voegelin about The Origins of Totalitarianism, that 
while “it is true that a Christian cannot become a follower of either Hitler or Stalin [and] morality 
as such is in jeopardy whenever the faith in God who gave the Ten Commandments is no longer 
secure,” it is mistaken to “conclude from the frightening events of our times that we have got to go 
back to religion and faith for political reasons” (“A Reply,” Review of Politics 15 [1953]: 82). The 
Rohilla were a South Asian people at fi rst targeted by the rival Marathas and then by their British 
allies—in what became one of the imperial scandals of Warren Hastings et al.—who hunted them 
down and decimated them as insurgents.
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The destruction of the Jews by the Nazi regime (with which Schmitt col-
laborated) could make the persistence of the religious into the secular not so 
much a matter of necessary continuity or craven obfuscation as it was one 
of wise foresight before the threat of secular catastrophe. The reasons for the 
complex interrelation of progressive secularization and regressive theology in 
the revolutionary crucible were not just “metaphysical.” They were moral, too.
To Fall Back Upon or at Least to Invoke
Like Schmitt, Arendt is tempted to see more naked political theologies in 
America where Europe chose more covert versions. The most obvious hold-
over for Americans is divinely inspired natural law and, as a corollary, rights 
talk. One might say that where the European revolutions were secular on their 
face but religious at their core, for Arendt the American Revolution was reli-
gious on its face even if secular at its core. Despite this difference, it is easy to 
read her depiction of American rights talk as an exemplifi cation of Schmitt’s 
thesis even in the new world that (on Arendt’s ultimate account) came close to 
a true secular founding.
In the earlier Origins of Totalitarianism Arendt shows that she thinks 
about rights precisely in the context of a secularizing transition. Her account 
in On Revolution candidly acknowledges the role that religious appeals played 
in the discourse of the American founding, as if she were willing to concede 
Schmitt’s presentation of America as honestly advertising its politics as divine 
in origin. In the earlier book Arendt suggests that the modern attempt to state 
moral norms independent of religious metaphysics raised an implication of 
which partisans of rights were “only half aware.” “The proclamation of [such] 
rights,” Arendt observes,
was also meant to be a much-needed protection in the new era where indi-
viduals were no longer secure in the estates to which they were born or sure 
of their equality before God as Christians. In other words, in the new secu-
larized and emancipated society, men were no longer sure of these social 
and human rights which until then had been outside the political order and 
guaranteed not by government and constitution, but by social, spiritual, 
and religious forces.14
Already, then, Arendt is thinking about rights as a secularizing attempt to 
make up for a function previously fulfi lled by religious civilization. By On 
14. Arendt, Origins of Totalitarianism, 291.
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Revolution Arendt sees rights talk as the major means by which Americans, 
having inherited the problem of the absolute from religion, more or less admit-
ted that only some concession to religion can solve it. But here she offers a 
further argument about why such persistence was necessary and how it showed 
up in events.
Maximilien Robespierre’s cult of the supreme being seems much less 
comical, she writes, when one bears in mind that the Americans were just as 
open about “the need for a divine principle, for some transcendent sanction in 
the political realm.” The reason for this need, Arendt contends, is that Amer-
ica, like Europe, inherited from Christianity not just a general religious back-
ground but also a transformation in the concept of lawfulness that made law’s 
authority dependent on its source: monotheism utterly transformed the notion 
of lawfulness in between classical and modern times and made a command 
model inescapable. Positivistic theories of law—which Arendt says actually 
cover natural law theories that are unfailingly rooted in some divine source 
even in the most deistic articulations—are open or covertly religious to the 
core. The impossibility of thinking of law except by positing some supra-
human source, however antediluvian or covert, made it almost inescapable 
that religion persist. This mutation provided another reason for interpreting 
America, too, in the backwash of the “long centuries when no secular realm 
existed in the Occident that was not ultimately rooted in the sanction given 
to it by the Church, and when therefore secular laws were understood as the 
mundane expression of a divinely ordained law.” The genealogical entangle-
ment of lawfulness itself in religion meant that even the American attempt to 
found a new order had “to put the law above man” (in Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s 
words) for its derivative laws to be authoritative; Rousseau’s conclusion that il 
faudrait des dieux—one would seem to need gods—for law to be legitimate 
applied with full force to the American scene (OR, 186, 189, 184).
Arendt is therefore not surprised to fi nd that, even when they did not 
explicitly refer to the divine origin of their proclaimed absolutes, American 
appeals to inalienable rights as a constraining higher law remained theologi-
cal or cryptotheological.
There was no avoiding the problem of the absolute—even though none of 
the country’s institutions and constituted bodies could be traced back to the 
factual development of absolutism—because it proved to be inherent in the 
traditional concept of law. . . . If the essence of secular law was a command, 
then a divinity, not nature but nature’s God, not reason but divinely informed 
reason, was needed to bestow validity on it.
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It is true that in Arendt’s fi nal view rights were merely a necessary rhetoric 
masking what was truly novel about the American founding. After all, Arendt 
also clearly thinks that their nakedly or covertly religious origin made “the 
proclamation of human rights or the guarantee of civil rights” simply unviable 
as “the aim or content of revolution.” Yet they surely persisted as rhetorical 
necessity—what the founders needed to “plead” at the very acme of their secu-
lar ambitions (OR, 196, 148; cf. 207).15 Rights talk is the specifi cally American 
form of political theology.
Pleading for Some Religious Sanction
Alas, European revolutions involved far more profound and dangerous polit-
ical theology than the supposedly merely “invoked” rights of the American 
scene. In fact, Arendt’s depiction of European political theologies is much 
less original, and may simply be borrowed from Schmitt’s earlier account, 
insofar as she sees European revolutions as reassigning God’s sovereign will 
to the people after the stopgap intermediation of absolutism. If her account 
of American political theology of rights is more original, and if she wants to 
exempt America from Schmitt’s exemplifi cation of political theology in the 
shift from vox dei to vox populi, it is only to assign that very exemplifi cation 
to European revolutions. Of course, Arendt’s dissatisfaction with the concept 
of sovereignty is well established and usefully studied in different sectors 
of the literature. Yet it bears insisting that the concept’s religious origins, and 
not just its normative confusions or practical effects, are what trouble her.
In On Revolution Arendt’s genealogical suggestions of this sort are sim-
ply pervasive, from her tracing of the word sovereignty back through Jean 
Bodin to the notion of divine majesty, through her analysis of absolutist 
experiment as one that made the Word fl esh, to her depiction of a French 
Revolution in which God’s will is merely transformed into that of people and 
nation. And she happily uses Schmitt’s rhetoric of obfuscation or disguise 
to explain the putatively new forms that the absolute took while remaining 
derivative of its original theological model, with simple “deifi cation of the 
people” the sad result. In particular, her focus on sovereign will as the key 
site of continuity between Christianity and modernity is an exact replica of 
Schmitt’s earlier claims. Not surprisingly, this material provides the fi rmest 
textual or historical link between Arendt and Schmitt on these matters, since 
15. Arendt seems most infl uenced to emphasize the natural law dimension of the American 
founding by Edward S. Corwin’s well-known works.
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in a note to one of her essays she explicitly praises Schmitt as “the most able 
defender of the notion of sovereignty” who “recognizes clearly that the root 
of sovereignty is the will.”16 In On Revolution she engages the Schmitt-
infl ected thesis of Ernst Kantorowicz that “when fi nally the Nation stepped 
into the pontifi cal shoes of the Prince, the modern A BSOLU T E STAT E, even 
without a Prince, was enabled to make claims like a Church.” Given what 
Arendt takes to be the singular isolation of the American version of politi-
cal theology compared with the triumphant and eventually globalized rival 
pattern of European sovereignty, one might go so far as to say that Arendt 
implicitly gives Schmitt credit for discerning a connection that established 
the model for modern history. “Today it is no longer of great relevance,” she 
writes, “whether the new absolute to be put into the place of the absolute 
sovereign was Sieyès’s nation from the beginnings of the French Revolution 
or whether it became with Robespierre, after four years of revolutionary his-
tory, the revolution itself. For what eventually set the world on fi re was pre-
cisely a combination of these two.”17
Arguably, therefore, On Revolution is, among other things, a distinctive 
if neglected alternative account of what Raymond Aron and Eric Voegelin 
variously called “secular religion” or “political religion”—terms they intro-
duced in the late 1930s to characterize and to explain totalitarianism and 
which in the last decade or so have made impressive inroads in the attempt 
to understand various historical regimes of the twentieth century.18 If Arendt 
rejected and avoided these terms when she encountered them in Cold War 
16. Hannah Arendt, “What Is Freedom?” in Between Past and Future, 240n21.
17. Arendt, OR, 16 (Bodin), 154–55, 158–59 (Bodin to the French Revolution), 159, 195 (“Word 
became fl esh”), 160 (“different disguises”), 195–96 (the nation as “the cheapest and most danger-
ous disguise the absolute ever took”), 183 (“deifi cation”), 154 (Kantorowicz), 157 (“world on fi re”). 
The Kantorowicz quotation is from Ernst Kantorowicz, “Mysteries of State: An Absolutist Concept 
and Its Late Mediaeval Origins,” Harvard Theological Review 48 (1955): 91. This is a precursor 
essay for Kantorowicz, The King’s Two Bodies: A Study in Mediaeval Political Theology (Prince-
ton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1957), in which Schmitt’s notion fi gures in the subtitle and 
which Arendt also cites in her On Revolution endnotes (306). (It is probably insignifi cant that when 
she does, she mistakenly omits the word political from his subtitle.) In her essay on authority 
Arendt mentions the premier Weimar-era critic of Schmitt’s pamphlet, Erik Peterson. Combined, 
these two pieces of evidence make certain Arendt’s awareness of Schmitt’s original theses.
18. See Eric Voegelin, Political Religions, trans. T. J. DiNapoli and E. S. Easterly III (Lewiston, 
NY: Mellen, 1986); and Raymond Aron, “The Future of the Secular Religions,” in The Dawn of Uni-
versal History: Selected Essays from a Witness to the Twentieth Century, trans. Barbara Bray (New 
York: Basic Books, 2002), 177–202. The journal Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions and 
the historical works of its former editor Michael Burleigh have been the main recent sites in English 
for this discussion; see also Emilio Gentile, Politics as Religion, trans. George Staunton (Princeton, 
NJ: Princeton University Press, 2006).
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debates, it is because she insists—unlike the original advocates of the label and 
their contemporary descendants—that such secular commitments as atheism 
and secular movements as communism are not simply religions that dare not 
speak their names (in Voegelin’s view, for instance, they are previously sup-
pressed heresies). For Arendt, the current theories of “political religion,” rang-
ing their objects among historical faiths as if they were simple additions, have 
failed to develop a theory of their signifi cance as the outcome of a dynamic 
she identifi es. Their secularism may seem like simple camoufl age, but only the 
modern agenda of substituting for religion can make sense of whatever theistic 
character there may be to totalitarian ideologies and regimes.19
In Principle Independent of Religious Sanction
Yet if Arendt goes so far with Schmitt to document the political theologies 
of the moderns, she seems to do so with the ultimate intent of denying the 
necessity and thus the outcome of his nostalgic analysis. Despite her view of 
rights, it is of the essence, in reviewing her unorthodox reinterpretation of the 
American colonies and the revolution they spawned, to emphasize the abso-
lute priority she gives to vindicating its achievement as transcending theo-
logical or cryptotheological continuity. Conceptually, she can do so because 
of her claim that the absolute came before religion and could explain both its 
force in its time and its supersession in the end: “The long alliance between 
religion and authority,” to repeat the clearest formulation, “does not neces-
sarily prove that the concept of authority is itself of a religious nature” (RP, 
372). Nevertheless, even here, Arendt wants to take Schmitt’s allegation seri-
ously. Perhaps she felt that she was herself coming close enough to articulat-
ing a political theology that she wanted to defend in advance against the charge 
that she has failed to see it.
It is well known that Arendt locates the essence of the American achieve-
ment in settler covenants and “mutual promises.” From the shipboard com-
pact of the Mayfl ower colonists to the Fundamental Orders of Connecticut 
to the Declaration of Independence, Americans created a political realm of 
nonsovereign freedom and mutual equality. In this way the earliest Americans 
stumbled into a practice (never theorized) of action in concert, bringing them 
out of solitude into common worldliness, that no other modern polity discov-
ered. When the American Revolution came, it simply continued this inchoate 
tradition, the confl ict with the mother country leading to explicit clarifi cation 
19. See esp. Arendt, “A Reply,” 81–82; Arendt, RP; and Hannah Arendt, Denktagebuch, ed. 
Ursula Ludz and Ingeborg Nordmann, 2 vols. (Munich: Piper, 2002), 1:363–64.
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of the prior basis of politics on new shores. “It was as though the Revolution 
liberated the power of covenant and constitution-making as it had shown 
itself in the earliest days of colonization,” Arendt proposes. In saying so, she is 
undoubtedly inspired by Perry Miller’s major investigations of New En gland 
covenants, but she leans most heavily on a Merrill Jensen article suggesting 
that these covenants informed the American belief that simple agreement to 
join together for common ends created valid government, a belief rooted in 
practice that underwrote the Declaration of Independence—if not its periph-
eral and dispensable natural rights language, then its mutual pledge of Amer-
icans to one another in a common cause.20
Yet—one might immediately think—the notion of the covenant is one of 
the hoariest theological concepts there is. Originally introduced to describe 
God’s compact (b’rit) with Noah after the fl ood, the heart of his relationship 
with Israel from Abraham through Moses, and renewed by Jesus (on Paul’s 
interpretation at any rate), the covenant in biblical literature is divine in initia-
tive, derivation, membership, and terms.21 It is rather shocking that the very 
concept by which Arendt hopes to see Americans transcending political theol-
ogy is one fully religious in its lineage. Almost unbelievably, of course, Arendt 
reads the activity of covenants (most often in her sources explicitly framed in 
God’s company) as independent not simply of overseas monarchs but also of 
divine superintendence of any sort. Occasional remarks in her corpus suggest 
that she thinks this way about Jesus himself—as a worldly actor whose basic 
contribution swung free of his happenstance divinity—but On Revolution rests 
its case on his American colonial followers pursuing their errand in the wilder-
ness.22 “The colonial compacts had been made without any reference to king 
or prince,” Arendt writes, stressing their preparation of the later claim of colo-
nial autonomy from the monarchy. It is as if the page before she had not noted 
that the compacts were made “in the Presence of God,” not just “one another,” 
or had failed to master the obvious fact that the fi nal paragraph of the Declara-
20. Arendt, OR, 165–78, 167 for her words, and 308–9n for her citation of Jensen’s article; Perry 
Miller, The New England Mind, 2 vols. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1939–54); 
Merrill Jensen, “Democracy and the American Revolution,” Huntington Library Quarterly 20 
(1956–57): 321–41. Arendt affi rms elsewhere in the work that the “greatness” of the Declaration 
“owes nothing to its natural law philosophy” but fl ows from the fact that it was “the perfect way for 
an action to appear in words” (126–27).
21. See, e.g., Delbert R. Hillers, Covenant: The History of a Biblical Idea (Baltimore: Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 1969), which studies the idea in the context of ancient Near Eastern legal 
concepts from which it may have been derived.
22. See esp. Arendt, Human Condition, 238–40, 246–47.
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23. Arendt, OR, 172, 170; Hannah Arendt, “Remarks at the American Society for Christian 
Ethics, January 21, 1973,” Hannah Arendt Collection.
tion of Independence, which features the mutual-pledge language, also appeals 
both to “the Supreme Judge of the world” and to “the protection of divine 
providence” (OR, 166–67). How could covenants be an answer to Schmitt 
when, as a matter of historical fact, they would seem to perfectly exemplify 
his claims?
Before reaching any conclusion, it is at least worth seeing that Arendt 
anticipates the objection that the covenant is continuous with religion, too, 
ultimately as dependent as natural rights on some theistic lineage. Though 
she only briefl y mentions its distant origins in On Revolution, she of course 
knows what its background was. But what stands out for her is the revo-
lution in meaning by the time of the colonists. “The Biblical covenant . . . 
was a compact between God and Israel by virtue of which God gave the law 
and Israel consented to keep it,” Arendt remarks, “while this [i.e., the colo-
nial] covenant implied government by consent, . . . where actually the whole 
principle of rulership no longer applied.” Or, as she told the American Soci-
ety for Christian Ethics in 1973, “there is no doubt that the notion of cove-
nant itself somehow is Biblical in origin . . . [but a] covenant of mutuality—
this covenant which relies only on mutuality—cannot possibly be compared 
to covenants in which one party is God, to whom we owe existence, cre-
ation, and so on, also law and [in which] we only pledge our obedience.” 
This shift in its content, she concludes in On Revolution, made “the act of 
mutual promise . . . in principle independent of religious sanction.”23 Thus 
she hopes to shield her presentation of colonial secularism, precisely at the 
moment of its maximum apparent vulnerability, from the force of the thesis 
of continuity.
How so? Theoretically, she says, it looks as if John Locke—though she 
could and perhaps should have mentioned earlier fi gures—cemented the shift 
of covenant from a divinely initiated contract to a purely human agreement 
among equals. But on the one hand, Arendt says, Locke may well have drawn 
on the American experience in imagining a compact of free and equal men as 
the foundation of government. On the other, he presented a model in which 
the outcome of the political bargain is consensual hierarchy in a model not of 
free and equal citizens but a one-to-one relation between private rightholder 
and public sovereign (the latter, she notes again, liable to be thought about on 
analogy with divine power—as a mortal god). Thus the common image of 
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24. Of course, it is far from incidental, if Jeremy Waldron is right, that the Americans insisted 
that promissory equality required God’s presence (God, Locke, and Equality: Christian Founda-
tions of Locke’s Political Thought [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002]).
25. Somehow, on Arendt’s account, Montesquieu alone among theorists escapes the modern 
necessity of an absolute, but however he did so does not allow for revolutions to dispense with it. 
This crucial point is, I believe, missed in the subtle article by Patchen Markell on the themes in this 
paragraph (“The Rule of the People: Arendt, Arché, and Democracy,” American Political Science 
Review 100 [2006]: 1–14).
26. Arendt, OR, 209 on reconstructions and the “silence” of the “classical archive” for moderns.
Locke as America’s philosopher either mistook the source for the recipient 
or missed the difference between promissory equality and consensual hier-
archy. The key for Arendt is that the Americans “had no notion of any the-
ory,” for the rise of promissory action is not “a theory or a tradition” but “an 
event”; “no theory, theological or political or philosophical, but their own deci-
sion to leave the Old World behind and to venture forth into an enterprise 
entirely of their own led into a sequence of acts and occurrences in which 
they would have perished, had not they turned to the matter long and intensely 
enough to discover, almost by inadvertence, the elementary grammar of 
political action” (OR, 170–73, 308–9n).24
At the stage of the actual revolutionaries, Arendt continues, the prac-
tical inheritance of Puritan covenants may have led to, or blended with, the 
avowed theoretical recovery of classical politics to lead America to the inten-
tional striving for a secular order. Of course, neither Greek nor Roman law 
featured the premise of a lawgiver outside the law; those concepts of law 
mooted any search for an absolute. So no simple return was available, moder-
nity able to retrieve classical wisdom only in the context of its enduring mono-
theistic legacy—what I called at the outset religion’s presence in its absence—
of the need for an absolute (OR, 186–89).25 Thus, where the ancient world had 
reconstitutions (with no absolutes), the modern world has revolutions (with 
absolutes).26 In retrieving Virgil’s Fourth Eclogue and updating its key line 
from magnus ordo saeclorum to novus ordo saeclorum—the motto of the dol-
lar bill eventually—the Americans at once rehabilitated what classical wis-
dom they could but also did so in the new and unparalleled circumstance of a 
postreligious founding. Curiously, the wisdom they saved has been much com-
mented on before—with its analogy between natality and foundation and its 
emphasis on the double meaning of arché as beginning and principle. But 
the essentially postreligious character of the new context has been neglected 
(OR, 211–15).
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A preliminary word on the Fourth Eclogue is needed to put Arendt’s 
discussion in its proper context. The poem’s afterlife over the centuries has 
not been told in any comprehensive history, but its prophecy of a sempiter-
nal regime had major resonance in Germany in the interwar period—an era 
whose discussions Arendt’s own treatment references and with which she 
engages. As Theodore Ziolkowski explains, there was a “remarkable turn” 
to the Fourth Eclogue in Weimar Germany, one centered, essentially, on 
whether to read it in a theological and proto-Christian way or in the secu-
lar spirit of classical politics. But Arendt’s interpretation, in examining the 
transformation from the Virgilian poetry to the American slogan, focuses 
precisely on the shift in meaning of one of the poem’s key words: saeculum 
(pl. gen., saeculorum, shortened in the poem for metrical reasons). In substi-
tuting for Virgil’s “great order of the ages (or centuries)” with their own “new 
order,” Americans signaled that they were forced to begin anew, unlike prior 
collectives, even if they could fi nd the solution to their new problem of the 
absolute simply in the mutual project of their founding itself. But, as Arendt 
insists, this new source of authority is one they implicitly or even accidentally 
chose against any “transcendent, transmundane” alternative, thus playing—
and this is the crucial point—on the slow transformation in the notion of saecu-
lum since classical times, one that made it more than the strictly temporal 
concept it was initially.
The American formula transforms classical wisdom, in other words, to 
stress not just the novelty but also the secularity of the modern enterprise. 
Coming to denote a domain outside religion (from its medieval legal usage to 
mean appropriation of church property by irreligious powers), it is no acci-
dent that Arendt, under whose pen the word secular in its fully contempo-
rary acceptation appears constantly, singles out the American order as a secu-
lar one. Arendt uses the expression transcendent, transmundane in describing 
a religious foundation the American founders somehow avoid but also, signifi -
cantly, in repudiating the standard Christian interpretation of Virgil’s poem as 
a prophecy of Christ’s reign. The American founders, it seems, had already 
shown the limits of the millennial Christian appropriation of the poem—still 
defended in Weimar Germany, in Eduard Norden’s best-selling essay that 
Arendt singles out for criticism. Her reading of how the Americans updated 
Virgil (a shift to which she returns in The Life of the Mind, in some of the last 
pages she wrote) thus provides in miniature Arendt’s overall interpretation 
of the place of revolution in modern politics: a classical revival at its best, to be 
sure, but one in new and changed circumstances that were crucially post- and 
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27. Arendt, OR, 196, 200, 205 (internal absolute), 205 (“transcendent, transmundane”), 211 
(Eclogue), 317nn (on Norden: “I doubt the religious signifi cance of the poem”); Theodore Ziolkowski, 
Virgil and the Moderns (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993), 88, which includes a 
discussion of Norden, Die Geburt des Kindes: Geschichte einer religiösen Idee (Leipzig: Teubner, 
1924), in the context of Weimar intellectual history. An important article assembling all of Arendt’s 
appeals to Virgil and stressing her neglected interest in Roman political thought generally never-
theless devotes only the briefest attention to the Fourth Eclogue and misses the issue of the secular 
at stake in the poem: Dean Hammer, “Hannah Arendt and Roman Political Thought: The Practice 
of Theory,” Political Theory 30 (2002): 124–49. On the semantic drift of saeculum see Otto Brun-
ner et al., eds., Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe (Stuttgart: Klett, 1972–97), s.v. “Säkularisation, 
Säkularisierung.” For what little is known about the origins of the dollar-bill motto see J. Edwin 
Hendricks, “Charles Thomson and the Creation of ‘A New Order of the Ages,’” in America, the 
Middle Period: Essays in Honor of Bernard Mayo, ed. John B. Boles (Charlottesville: University 
Press of Virginia, 1973), 1–13. See later Hannah Arendt, The Life of the Mind, 2 vols. (New York: 
Harcourt, Brace, 1981), 2:207.
28. The major student of covenants in New England after Perry Miller, though apparently 
unaware that he is refuting Arendt’s argument, concludes that “seventeenth-century New England 
continued to have a deep sense of hierarchy, and . . . none of the civil or church covenants are cast 
as contracts. God, Christ, king, the central colonial government, and the local town council were 
superiors in civil covenants, and God, Christ, clergy, and elders were the superiors in church cov-
enants. . . . The inferiors . . . submitted themselves to their covenantal superiors” (David A. Weir, 
Early New England: A Covenanted Society [Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2005], 227–28).
anti- or at least nonreligious. So it is that for Arendt the American Revolution 
(unlike any classical polity and holdover formulas aside) equals secularization, 
and vice versa.27
Only Immanent Categories
It goes almost without saying that Arendt’s depiction of the egalitarian polit-
ical content and the putative secular basis of covenants—America’s inciden-
tally religious colonists and its purely worldly founding—bears little relation 
to historical fact.28 It is not clear how complete her failure is, however, for 
two essential reasons. One is that historians might be prepared to reinvent 
Arendt’s argument by rethinking its historical details—indeed, this reinven-
tion has already occurred. When “the republican thesis” cast America’s sec-
ular achievement as fl owing from a different lineage, it no longer relied on 
(in fact, specifi cally criticized) the linkage between covenants and democ-
racy, replacing it with a Euro-American neo-Roman tradition with deep 
roots. Largely unknown to Arendt herself, even if she inspired its discovery, 
this heritage obviated the need to posit the immaculate conception of secu-
larism on American shores; breaking completely with Arendt’s empirical 
claims to reclaim her normative impulses, however, J. G. A. Pocock’s recon-
struction of the republican tradition premised the movement precisely on 
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29. J. G. A. Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment: Florentine Political Thought and the Atlantic 
Republican Tradition (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1975), pt. 1, passim and 550.
30. The expression is essentially a pleonasm, given the relation in Arendt’s German between 
säkular and weltlich and Säkularisierung and Verweltlichung, unless one interprets the apparent 
redundancy as only further highlighting the irreligious basis of worldly politics in her thought.
31. This description is from the editorial material in Jacob Taubes, The Political Theology of 
Paul, trans. Dana Hollander (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2004), 139. Taubes wants to 
develop, in opposition to Schmitt, a political theology of covenant putatively more faithful to the 
Jewish tradition that does not insist on political representation of God but still locates him in the 
background of human community; obviously, Arendt’s attempt to move beyond Schmitt is much 
more radical, since Taubes still agrees with Schmitt that the autonomy of human politics is impos-
sible and thus that a political theology of some sort is still necessary.
replacing medieval homo credens with modern homo politicus, so that the 
ideology is fundamentally postreligious and secular.29
The more meaningful reason is that the theoretical option Arendt 
carves out is what matters, not whether any historical case vindicates it (yet). 
Arendt aims to identify an alternative to political theology and a model of 
human coexistence genuinely independent of religious premises: what she 
calls “a purely secular, worldly realm” (OR, 226).30 More important, in her 
discussion of covenants, Arendt designs her argument, whatever its histori-
cal validity, with an eye to warding off the allegation that all modern poli-
tics are in straightforward or encrypted continuity with the religious past. 
One could then say that Arendt’s crucial theoretical gambit is her alternative 
model of modernization—one that licenses the hypothetical possibility of 
secularization—even if her association of it with a particular place and time 
in history turns out to be specious.
If so, then Schmitt’s presence in Arendt’s mind (or at least over her 
reader’s shoulder) helps disengage important but generally neglected fea-
tures of her text. He helps, to sum up, in identifying a fascinating dynamic in 
her argumentation. By defi ning religion as a powerful version of authority, 
but only one of its possible forms, Arendt allows herself to travel a great 
distance in Schmitt’s company, but to reach an alternative—the alternative—
destination. She incorporates a version of his argument into her own, but in 
the service of escaping it. In short, if it is Schmitt’s fi rm position that “there 
are no ‘immanent’ categories to which a political order could appeal for its 
legitimacy,” then Arendt, without gainsaying the potential appeal of the tran-
scendent, just as fi rmly wants to take the reverse position.31 The religious past 
affects the revolutionary project and makes an exact return to the classics 
impossible; the intractable problem of the absolute, she thinks, forbids it. But 
even so, it does not follow that religion is interminable.
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Coda: Separating Politics and Religion Once and for All
So Arendt was a defender—analytically and programmatically—of what is 
now known as “the secular.” Yet today this commitment is viewed with con-
siderable suspicion, and it seems worth concluding by considering what Arendt 
might say about this fact. In recent years the most formidable analyst of the 
category of the secular and the politics of secularism is Talal Asad, whose 
powerful and multifaceted critique of those categories is not easy to meet.32 
For Asad, the secular, which claims merely to privatize religion, actually works 
on a falsely universalized model of religion (often sidelining its practical and 
political aspects to reduce it to individual belief and devotion). Indeed, the rise 
of secularism itself somehow brought religion as a category about and is much 
better seen as a self-transformation of Christianity than as a potentially gener-
alizable phenomenon. Of course, the outcome of this critique is to trace the not 
infrequently hierarchical distribution of power and its material and moral inci-
dents between the “secular West” and the religious rest of the world back to the 
basic categories devised to legitimate that hierarchy.
Asad’s position is not simple, and he is most defi nitely not arguing 
Schmitt’s stance that what claims to be secular is “really” just sacred in ori-
gin and disguise. He hopes to avoid making secularization an explanatory 
tool so that it can get attention as an object of refl ection; the point is to tran-
scend the entire debate about whether secularization did or did not happen 
in order to see what commitments that debate might presuppose. The cri-
tique intends to identify Christianity as the source that, instead of originally 
being a religion, created the category of religion in claiming to give rise to a 
secular politics (one prone to serious exclusions, notably of those unwilling 
or unable to follow its historical trajectory). “Christianity turned against 
itself,” Gil Anidjar writes in voicing the critique, “while slowly coming to 
name that to which it ultimately claimed to oppose itself: religion. . . . Chris-
tianity invented the distinction between religious and secular and thus made 
religion. It made religion the problem—rather than itself. . . . secularism is 
a name Christianity gave itself when it invented religion, when it named its 
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other or others as religions.” There is no easy way to dispose with the cri-
tique of secularism today. But one might still wonder if it is possible to turn 
to Arendt for a response and in defense of the secular as a potentially univer-
salizable mood and agenda. “To uphold secularism . . . is, I am afraid, not to 
be all that worldly,” Anidjar says.33 Was Arendt therefore wrong to care so 
deeply for their mutual inclusion—to insist on a political realm that would be 
secular and therefore worldly?
It is hard to avoid the impression that Asad has someone like Arendt 
dead to rights. Since she seems to have (like Schmitt) taken Catholicism as 
her model, avoiding the Protestant emphasis on “belief” on which the con-
cept of religion came to be based, Arendt does not expunge the practical and 
even political aspects of the phenomenon. But her Eurocentrism is notable, 
and her heavy reliance on the dichotomy between religion as a category and 
secularity as a category ought to be clear by now. Yet a closer look suggests 
that her position is more complex. In the fi rst place, all of her examples in dis-
cussing secularization above assume, albeit most often in silence, that Chris-
tianity quite specifi cally is the antecedent to Western modernity. Though it is 
not said so directly in On Revolution, Arendt states forthrightly elsewhere 
that “the separation of the public and religious spheres of life which we call 
secularism did not simply sever politics from religion in general but very 
specifi cally from the Christian creed” (RP, 379). Far from seeing identifi ca-
tion of this connection in all its specifi city as obviating study of the overt and 
covert persistence of Christianity—for example, in the form of “secular” 
rights and modern sovereignty—she insists on it. All the same, she does not 
argue a version of Asad’s position avant la lettre; instead of thinking through 
in some comparative way what may have been distinct about Christianity 
and its ongoing aftermath, she feels free simply to generalize from its case, 
as if that could save her the trouble of some larger analysis of religion and 
modernity.
Still, restricting attention to her limited example, Arendt does strive to 
fi nd the possibility of transcending Christianity in the name of a truly irre-
ligious order, a possibility that Asad denies. What arguments might she then 
offer today beset by the specifi c new form of the critique of secularism? I 
believe there are two, one critical and one positive. The fi rst involves properly 
appraising the novelty of secularization as something that happened to Chris-
tianity rather than as something it did to itself. After all, the critique of secular-
ism, while in content quite different from Schmitt’s allegation of continuity, 
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has much the same form as the one Schmitt defended. The critique of secular-
ism formally resembles Schmitt’s political theology, except it particularizes its 
object. That is, it radicalizes the claim about political theology by arguing that 
secularism itself is the new form of (a particular) religion. Though she con-
cedes some persistence of Christianity—indeed, she insists on it—Arendt is 
equally concerned with getting clear about how exactly to explain it. She notes 
at the start of On Revolution the then ubiquitous “claim that all modern revolu-
tions are essentially Christian in origins, and this even when their professed 
faith is atheism.” (Apparently, the project of unmasking “the secular” is not 
so new after all.) But given that revolutions are precisely modern rather than 
Christian, she continues, “the best one can say in favor of this theory” is that
it needed modernity to liberate the revolutionary germs in the Christian 
faith, which is obviously begging the question. . . . Secularization, the sepa-
ration of religion from politics and the rise of a secular realm with a dignity 
of its own, is certainly a crucial factor in the phenomenon of revolution. . . . 
But if this is true, then it is secularization itself, and not the contents of 
Christian teachings, which constitutes the origins of revolution. (OR, 18–19; 
emphasis added)
Even if it were true, in other words, that one found “spilt religion” (T. E. Hulme) 
in modern politics, it is the “spilling” that has to be explained.
Now, it is ironic that Arendt herself in the same book makes claims 
about persistence that do not take her own directive to heart. It is true that 
she tries to unearth the revolutionary dynamic that might explain why, at the 
moment of secularization, Christianity survived in overt or covert forms. But 
she does not really consider in the book—or anywhere else, to my knowledge—
what sparked secularization (and thus revolution), unless she thinks that it was 
simply entailed by the failure of stopgap absolutism all by itself. That argu-
ment only begs the question. On her own understanding, it would not explain 
the American case anyway. All the same, her directive stands as a challenge 
to the claim—Schmittian in form if not in substance—that secularism is Chris-
tianity in dissimulated form. That position, she might say, does not explain 
why the move to the covert transpired and may not acknowledge the major 
transformations that occurred in that process. Just as a modernization that lib-
erates revolution from Christianity has to be seen as a modernization against 
Christianity, so a transformation that produces secularism from Christianity 
has to be seen as a transformation against Christianity, despite whatever con-
tinuities remain.
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No doubt, that critical argument does not fi nally decide the balance 
between break and persistence in transitions as complex as the rise of “the 
secular.” Yet there is another, positive argument one might imagine Arendt 
offering, in the space opened by the critical one. It is also possible to infer it 
from her existing work because of the Schmittian form of the critique of secu-
larism as Christianity’s self-encryption. Arendt’s best hope would have been 
not to stake her theory of secularization on particular historical details but to 
present it as a conceptual scheme that might avoid reducing the category of the 
secular, the process of secularization, and the politics of secularism to the 
forms they have so far taken. After all, Arendt’s claim is that secularization is 
precisely that process that risks its own subversion and is likely to lead to its 
interruption and even its falsifi cation. If so, then the persistence of Christianity 
in the name of secularism is not a phenomenon she would have been surprised 
to fi nd, since in some versions she insists on it herself. But, far from spelling 
the bankruptcy of secularism, Arendt thinks that this result only redoubled the 
need to advance it. The contemporary critique of secularism confuses history 
and possibility, allowing the historical investigation of the “masks” (Asad’s 
term) of secularism to distract from philosophical contention that it can have a 
true face. Arendt strives mightily—in some ways this is the point of her study 
of revolutions—to avoid the confusion between these two outcomes. Arendt 
argues in effect that it is possible to concede the critique’s interpretive claims 
while disputing its analytic framework and normative consequences. The per-
sistence of religion, when found, does not preclude its obsolescence or a politi-
cal life beyond its powerful claims.
Still, Arendt’s efforts are at best early struggles to lay out what a sec-
ularist perspective might look like. The risk of political theology that she 
emphasizes—but not enough—in the end still swamped not only the modern 
project of revolution but also her own project as an author. For even more 
troubling than the infi rm and hypothetical version in which one can salvage 
any plausible secularist alternative from On Revolution is a fi nal harsh real-
ity: Arendt herself occasionally uses theological language to describe precisely 
the secular politics she advocates. It is legendary that in The Human Condi-
tion she refers to the possibility of new beginnings involved in political action 
as miraculous.34 But the religious idea of miracles as a model of political 
96  Hannah Arendt on the Secular
revolution is precisely the case that Schmitt himself cited as the best evi-
dence for political theology. And at the very climax of On Revolution Arendt’s 
rhetoric lapses, blatantly, into the theological. While repudiating the tradi-
tional Christian interpretation of Virgil’s Fourth Eclogue as a prediction of 
Jesus’ birth, Arendt, for her part, wants to read the poem as an “affi rm[ation 
of] the divinity of birth as such”—a prophecy of the enigmatic natality that 
will provide the ground of secular coexistence (OR, 212). Arendt fi nds some-
thing religious, one might say, in the very secularity she prizes. Like the lan-
guage of political miracle that Schmitt targeted, this appeal to the divinity of 
birth fi ts ambiguously, and perhaps confl icts fl agrantly, with Arendt’s more 
basic attempt to strive for a purely secular politics.
Does this last fact then wreck any attempt to present Arendt as a secu-
larist? Might it even show that whatever her fervent hopes of transcending 
political theology, the latter must always—as Schmitt originally suggested—
have the fi nal word (or last laugh)? There would seem to be only one way to 
respond to these questions in the negative: to contend that, far from contra-
dicting her argument about the diffi culty of overcoming political theology, 
Arendt performs it, unwittingly, no doubt, but perhaps more convincingly, 
in the very course of framing it most strenuously. If the move to the secular 
is diffi cult as a matter of theory, it has to be just as diffi cult as a matter of the 
practice of theory. At the very moment of propounding a secular vision of the 
political realm, Arendt falls back on or at least invokes religion; in her own 
view of revolutions, however, this troubling dynamic does not foreclose, and at 
worst conceals or postpones, the secular. The persistence of political theology 
could be a prelude to its end.
